National Security Agency Mandatory declassification review release. One recommendation shared by many of the scientists, whether they supported the report or not, was that the United States inform Stalin of the bomb before it was used. The Soviets already knew about the U.S. atomic project from espionage sources in the United States and Britain so Molotovs comment to Ambassador Harriman about the secrecy surrounding the U.S. atomic project can be taken with a grain of salt, although the Soviets were probably unaware of specific plans for nuclear use. [46]. Later that year, the Uranium Committee completed its report and OSRD Chairman Vannevar Bush reported the findings to President Roosevelt: As Bush emphasized, the U.S. findings were more conservative than those in the British MAUD report: the bomb would be somewhat less effective, would take longer to produce, and at a higher cost. they used the atomic bomb to intimidate russia and not to force a war with japan. [19], Joseph E. Davies Papers, Library of Congress, box 17, 21 May 1945, While officials at the Pentagon continued to look closely at the problem of atomic targets, President Truman, like Stimson, was thinking about the diplomatic implications of the bomb. The Hiroshima operation was originally slated to begin in early August depending on local conditions. The non-specialist staff sent to observe these effects, their biased premise, and the markings on the documents all suggest that the report was from the beginning meant to anticipate and align with Stalins intention to downplay the importance of the United States atomic bomb while pushing the Soviet Unions own nuclear project forward. By 1937 Japan controlled large sections of China and accusations of war crimes against the Chinese people became commonplace. Was the dropping of the atomic bombs morally justifiable. The intention was to force Japan to surrender, thus avoiding a long war in the Pacific. Robert J. Maddox has cited this document to support his argument that top U.S. officials recognized that Japan was not close to surrender because Japan was trying to stave off defeat. In a close analysis of this document, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, who is also skeptical of claims that the Japanese had decided to surrender, argues that each of the three possibilities proposed by Weckerling contained an element of truth, but none was entirely correct. If there was a misfire the weapon would be difficult for the Japanese to recover, which would not be the case if Tokyo was targeted. Targeting Germany was rejected because the Germans were considered more likely to secure knowledge from a defective weapon than the Japanese. [13]. The documents cover multiple aspects of the bombings and their context. For a review of the debate on casualty estimates, see Walker (2005), 315, 317-318, 321, 323, and 324-325. A modern-day nuclear bomb . On August 6, 1945, just days after the Potsdam Conference ended, the U.S. bomber Enola Gay dropped the uranium bomb known as "Little Boy" on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. When he learned of the atomic bombing from the Domei News Agency, Togo believed that it was time to give up and advised the cabinet that the atomic attack provided the occasion for Japan to surrender on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration. Judgment at the Smithsonian(New York: Matthews and Company, 1995), pp. Hasegawa cited it and other documents to make a larger point about the inability of the Japanese government to agree on concrete proposals to negotiate an end to the war. For more recent contributions, see Sean Malloy,Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb Against Japan(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), Andrew Rotter,Hiroshima: The World's Bomb(New York: Oxford, 2008), Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko,The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War(New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008), Wilson D. Miscamble,The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). The ban on the public use of the phrase was officially lifted when the war ended on August 15, which prompted Hiroshimas local newspaper, the Chgoku Shimbun, to print a few photos of the destroyed city on August 23. Historians have suggested a number of ways in which the atomic bomb might have alienated Stalin- 1. A flash, stronger than the sun itself, followed by a fiery explosion within seconds completely annihilated the city. Concerned that President Roosevelt had an overly cavalier belief about the possibility of maintaining a post-war Anglo-American atomic monopoly, Bush and Conant recognized the limits of secrecy and wanted to disabuse senior officials of the notion that an atomic monopoly was possible. [75]. How is the current debate about immigration in the United States rooted in our nations past? General Douglas MacArthur had been slated as commander for military operations against Japans mainland, this letter to Truman from Forrestal shows that the latter believed that the matter was not settled. Ramsey, a physicist, served as deputy director of the bomb delivery group, Project Alberta. The nuclear age had truly begun with the first military use of atomic weapons. [42]. General George C. Marshall is the only high-level official whose contemporaneous (pre-Hiroshima) doubts about using the weapons against cities are on record. We gave them fair warning and asked them to quit. Henry L. Stimson Papers (MS 465), Sterling Library, Yale University (reel 113) (microfilm at Library of Congress), Still interested in trying to find ways to warn Japan into surrender, this represents an attempt by Stimson before the Potsdam conference, to persuade Truman and Byrnes to agree to issue warnings to Japan prior to the use of the bomb. Former Secretary of War Henry Stimson found the criticisms troubling and published an influential justification for the attacks inHarpers. In this short memorandum to Groves deputy, General Farrell, Oppenheimer explained the need for precautions because of the radiological dangers of a nuclear detonation. [78]. Lower image - August 11, 1945, photo by 6th Photo Reconnaissance Group In a long and impassioned message, the latter argued why Japan must accept defeat: it is meaningless to prove ones devotion [to the Emperor] by wrecking the State. Togo rejected Satos advice that Japan could accept unconditional surrender with one qualification: the preservation of the Imperial House. Probably unable or unwilling to take a soft position in an official cable, Togo declared that the whole country will pit itself against the enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will as long as the enemy demands unconditional surrender., Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, James Forrestal Diaries, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was a regular recipient of Magic intercept reports; this substantial entry reviews the dramatic Sato-Togo exchanges covered in the 22 July Magic summary (although Forrestal misdated Satos cable as first of July instead of the 21st). The reason for why America dropped the Atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a contentious, emotive and particularly relevant issue, there are lots of speculations, however these are usually based on lies such as the "to save 500,000 American soldiers" which is clearly untrue. David Holloway, Barbarossa and the Bomb: Two Cases of Soviet Intelligence in World War II, in Jonathan Haslam and Karina Urbach, eds.,Secret Intelligence in the European States System, 1918-1989(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 63-64. Unfortunately, AP would not authorize the Archive to reproduce this item without payment. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-AEC), An overview of the destruction of Hiroshima [undated, circa August-September 1945]. Originally this collection did not include documents on the origins and development of the Manhattan Project, although this updated posting includes some significant records for context. As Alperovitz notes, the Davies papers include variant diary entries and it is difficult to know which are the most accurate. National Archives Identifier 535795] The Soviet atomic bomb was the result of miraculous synergistic fusion between scientists and engineers on the one hand, and the police state, with its awesome ability to mobilize resources, on. For varied casualty figures cited by Truman and others after the war, see Walker,Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan, 101-102. Marshall noted the opprobrium which might follow from an ill considered employment of such force. This document has played a role in arguments developed by Barton J. Bernstein that figures such as Marshall and Stimson were caught between an older morality that opposed the intentional killing of non-combatants and a newer one that stressed virtually total war.[22], RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. This. On August 6, 1945 the American war plane Enola Gay dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, killing between 70,000 and 100,000 Japanese. Read more, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NWWashington, DC 20004-3027, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project. Truman, who had been chair of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, said that only on the appeal of Secretary of War Stimson did he refrain and let the War Department continue with the experiment unmolested.. According to a Joint Chiefs of Staff report on Japanese target systems, expected results from the bombing campaign included: The absorption of man-hours in repair and relief; the dislocation of labor by casualty; the interruption of public services necessary to production, and above all the destruction of factories engaged in war industry. While Stimson would later raise questions about the bombing of Japanese cities, he was largely disengaged from the details (as he was with atomic targeting). Relations between the United States and Japan worsened when Japanese forces took aim at Indochina with the goal of capturing oil rich areas of the East Indies. Furthermore, the United States demanded that the Japanese withdraw from conquered areas of China and Indochina. RG 77, Tinian Files, April-December 1945, box 20, Envelope G Tinian Files, Top Secret, The prime target for the second atomic attack was Kokura, which had a large army arsenal and ordnance works, but various problems ruled that city out; instead, the crew of the B-29 that carried Fat Man flew to an alternate target at Nagasaki. But on 7 August, Stalin changed the instructions: the attack was to begin the next day. Takashi Itoh, ed., Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho [Sokichi Takagi: Diary and Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 916-917 [Translation by Hikaru Tajima], In 1944 Navy minister Mitsumasa Yonai ordered rear admiral Sokichi Takagi to go on sick leave so that he could undertake a secret mission to find a way to end the war. Three days later another atomic device was exploded over Nagasaki. For example, the governing clique that supported the peace moves was not trying to stave off defeat but was seeking Soviet help to end the war. For the distances, see Norris, 407. President Franklin Roosevelt called the attack a day which will live in infamy, and the American people were shocked and angered. If Russia used a nuclear weapon of any type, "I expect (the president) to say we're in a new situation, and the U.S. will directly enter the war against Russia to stop this government that has . Every August, newspapers are dotted with stories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, accompanied by a well-picked-over but never resolved . Toward that end, in 2005, at the time of the 60th anniversary of the bombings, staff at the National Security Archive compiled and scanned a significant number of declassified U.S. government documents to make them more widely available. On August 6, a B-29 nicknamed the 'Enola Gay ' dropped a single bomb containing 64 kilograms of highly enriched uranium over the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ed., Shusen Shiroku [Historical Record of the End of the War] (Tokyo: Hokuyosha, 1977-1978), vol. For reviews of the controversy, see Barton J. Bernstein, The Struggle Over History: Defining the Hiroshima Narrative, ibid., 128-256, and Charles T. OReilly and William A. Rooney,The Enola Gay and The Smithsonian(Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2005). In 1945, atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The possibility of modifying the concept of unconditional surrender so that it guaranteed the continuation of the emperor remained hotly contested within the U.S. government. Japan, sensing conflict was inevitable, began planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor by April, 1941. On Stimson, see Schaffer (1985), 179-180 and Malloy (2008), 54. The final decision to drop the atomic bomb, when it was made the following day, July 25, was decidedly anticlimactic. If it was, he believed that the bomb would be the master card in U.S. diplomacy. Is control of nuclear weapons necessary to maintain peace? 576 words. [77], Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files, Speech Files, 1945-1953, copy on U.S. National Archives Web Site, On 15 December, President Truman spoke about the atomic bombings in his speech at the annual dinner of the Gridiron Club, organized by bureau chiefs and other leading figures of print media organizations. In a progress report, Bush told President Roosevelt that the bomb project was on a pilot plant basis, but not yet at the production stage. Hasegawa argues that Truman realized that the Japanese would refuse a demand for unconditional surrender without a proviso on a constitutional monarchy and that he needed Japans refusal to justify the use of the atomic bomb.[47], Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter J. Thousands more would die of radiation exposure. Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File), July 1940-September 1945, box 12, S-1, Tacitly dissenting from the Targeting Committees recommendations, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall argued for initial nuclear use against a clear-cut military target such as a large naval installation. If that did not work, manufacturing areas could be targeted, but only after warning their inhabitants. As Farrell observed in his discussion of Hiroshima, Summaries of Japanese reports previously sent are essentially correct, as to clinical effects from single gamma radiation dose. Such findings dismayed Groves, who worried that the bomb would fall into a taboo category like chemical weapons, with all the fear and horror surrounding them. To suggest alternatives, they drafted this memorandum about the importance of the international exchange of information and international inspection to stem dangerous nuclear competition. To get production going, Bush wanted to establish a carefully chosen engineering group to study plans for possible production. This was the basis of the Top Policy Group, or the S-1 Committee, which Bush and James B. Conant quickly established. A significant contested question is whether, under the weight of a U.S. blockade and massive conventional bombing, the Japanese were ready to surrender before the bombs were dropped. His vivid account shows that senior military officials in the Manhattan Project were no longer dismissive of reports of radiation poisoning. The weapon is in the pit covered with canvas. After the first successful test of the atomic bomb in 1945, U.S. officials immediately considered the potential non-military benefits that could be derived from the American nuclear monopoly. which was the world's first atomic bomb to be used in welfare. [34], On the eve of the Potsdam conference, Leo Szilard circulated a petition as part of a final effort to discourage military use of the bomb. Barton J. Bernsteins 1987 article, Ike and Hiroshima: Did He Oppose It?The Journal of Strategic Studies10 (1987): 377-389, makes a case against relying on Eisenhowers memoirs and points to relevant circumstantial evidence. More updates on training missions, target selection, and conditions required for successful detonation over the target. Nevertheless, his diary suggests that military hard-liners were very much in charge and that Prime Minister Suzuki was talking tough against surrender, by evoking last ditch moments in Japanese history and warning of the danger that subordinate commanders might not obey surrender orders. Some may associate this statement with one that Eisenhower later recalled making to Stimson. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs brought renewed attention to these documents more recently on August 5, 2015, the same day Naryshkin was pointing a finger at the United States in his speech. Thus, Groves and others would try to suppress findings about radioactive effects, although that was a losing proposition.[76]. Sadao Asada, The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japans Decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration,Pacific Historical Review67 (1998): 101-148; Bix, 523; Frank, 348; Hasegawa, 298. Years of fighting brought the US armed forces closer and closer to Japan as they hopped from one island to another. The last remark aggravated Navy Minister Yonai who saw it as irresponsible. Stimson did not always have Trumans ear, but historians have frequently cited his diary when he was at the Potsdam conference. It is commonly believed that the awesome devastation of the atomic bombs caused the Japanese government to capitulate. In the belly of the bomber was Little Boy, an atomic bomb. An illustration of a nuclear bomb exploding in a city. (Truman finally cut off military aid to France to compel the French to pull back). Presumably the clarified warning would be issued prior to the use of the bomb; if the Japanese persisted in fighting then the full force of our new weapons should be brought to bear and a heavier warning would be issued backed by the actual entrance of the Russians in the war. Possibly, as Malloy has argued, Stimson was motivated by concerns about using the bomb against civilians and cities, but his latest proposal would meet resistance at Potsdam from Byrnes and other. For casualty figures and the experience of people on the ground, see Frank, 264-268 and 285-286, among many other sources. The United States Government's decision to attack Russia with the atomic bomb ultimate proved to scare the Russians. Some months later, with the Manhattan Project already underway and under the direction of General Leslie Grove, Bush outlined to Roosevelt the effort necessary to produce six fission bombs. For Davies at Potsdam, see Elizabeth Kimball MacLean,Joseph E. Davies: Envoy to the Soviets(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 151-166. Photo restoration by TX Unlimited, San Francisco, A nuclear weapon of the "Little Boy" type, the uranium gun-type detonated over Hiroshima. For the early criticisms and their impact on Stimson and other former officials, see Barton J. Bernstein, Seizing the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear History: Stimson, Conant, and Their Allies Explain the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,Diplomatic History17 (1993): 35-72, and James Hershberg,James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995), 291-301. [45]. [59]. A collectionoftranscribed documents is Gene Dannens Atomic Bomb: Decision. For a print collection of documents, see Dennis Merrill ed.,Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Volume I: The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb on Japan(University Publications of America, 1995). President Truman, who ordered the bomb, defended it as a way to bring about surrender and save U.S. military lives that would have been lost in a ground invasion of Japan. Early in the morning of August 9th Manchuria was invaded by the Soviet Union. Those and other questions will be subjects of discussion well into the indefinite future. [46] During the meeting on August 24, discussed above, Stimson gave his reasons for taking Kyoto off the atomic target list: destroying that city would have caused such bitterness that it could have become impossible to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians. Stimson vainly tried to preserve language in the Potsdam Declaration designed to assure the Japanese about the continuance of their dynasty but received Trumans assurance that such a consideration could be conveyed later through diplomatic channels (see entry for July 24). The reference to our contact may refer to Bank of International Settlements economist Pers Jacobbson who was in touch with Japanese representatives to the Bank as well as Gero von Gvernitz, then on the staff, but with non-official cover, of OSS station chief Allen Dulles. For the extensive literature, see the references in J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan,Third Edition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016) at 131-136, as well as Walkers, Recent Literature on Trumans Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground,Diplomatic History29 (April 2005): 311-334. Yonai was upset that Chief of Staff Yoshijiro Umezu and naval chief Suemu Toyada had sent the emperor a memorandum arguing that acceptance of the Brynes note would desecrate the emperors dignity and turn Japan into virtually a slave nation. The emperor chided Umezu and Toyoda for drawing hasty conclusions; in this he had the support of Yonai, who also dressed them down. [57]. . In this memorandum, Norstad reviewed the complex requirements for preparing B-29s and their crew for successful nuclear strikes. "The US decision to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a diplomatic measure calculated to intimidate the USSR in the post-second World War era rather than strictly a military measure designed to force Japan to unconditionallysurrender" Procedure: Use the documents, textbook pages 845-849, and your knowledge of the era to support a position on Documents 77A-B: The First Japanese Offer Intercepted. Pages 12 through 15 of those notes refer to the atomic bombing of Japan: You know the most terrible decision a man ever had to make was made by me at Potsdam. Public Reaction to the Atomic Bomb and World Affairs, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, April 1947. He wanted to intimidate the Soviet Union c. He wanted Japan's unconditional surrender d. He felt it would strengthen U.S.-Soviet relations 76 (copy from microfilm), Physicists Leo Szilard and James Franck, a Nobel Prize winner, were on the staff of the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago, a cover for the Manhattan Project program to produce fuel for the bomb. Second update - August 4, 2015 The target is and was always expected to be Japan., These documents have important implications for the perennial debate over whether Truman inherited assumptions from the Roosevelt administration that the bomb would be used when available or that he madethedecision to do so.